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ABSTRACT  Young  people’s  perceptions  and  preferences  regarding  main  channels  of 
upward mobility are very important for integration in every society. After one decade of 
blocked post-socialist transformation, political changes in 2000 unblocked the process of 
transformation of Serbian society, raising young people’s expectations of the improvement of 
their  social  position.  Modernization  and  democratization  of  political  system,  as  well  as 
market reforms of the economic system would definitely make this process more probable. 
These reforms, if carried out properly, would enable the activation of young people and their 
inclination  towards  modern  and  development-oriented  ways  of  advancement  in  society. 
Nevertheless, empirical studies in the last ten years in Serbia have constantly shown large 
discrepancy in youth’s perceived and preferred factors of upward social mobility. Namely, 
although  education  and  hard  work  have been  emphasized  by  young  people  as  the  main 
preferred means of getting ahead, wealthy origin and political connections have been, in 
fact, perceived as the most important factors in this respect in Serbia during the last decade. 
Political  instability,  (still)  uncompleted  reform  of  political  and  economic  system  and 
economic growth without employment (especially of young people) are the main reasons why 
half of the young population has had, more or less, a constant wish to leave Serbia forever. 
The main thesis of this paper is that the above-mentioned discrepancy between preferred and 
perceived “social order” represents one of the key basis of such a way of thinking of young 
people in Serbia. 
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APSTRAKT  Percepcije  i  preferencije  mladih  osoba  o  glavnim  kanalima  vertikalne 
pokretljivosti su veoma važne za integraciju u svakom društvu. Nakon decenije blokirane 
postsocijalističke  transformacije,  političke  promene  2000.  godine  odblokirale  su  proces 
transformacije  srpskog  društva,  podižući  očekivanja  mladih  kada  je  reč  o  poboljšanju 
njihovog  društvenog  položaja.  Modernizacija  i  demokratizacija  političkog  sistema,  kao  i 
tržišne reforme privrednog sistema bi zasigurno ovaj proces učinili izvesnijim. Ove reforme, 
dosledno sprovedene, aktivirale bi mlade ljude i njihove inklinacije ka modernim i tržišno 
orijentisanim načinima napredovanja u društvu. Ipak, iskustvene analize poslednjih deset 
godina u Srbiji su ponovljeno ukazivale na veliku razliku između stvarnih i poželjnih činilaca 
uzlazne društvene pokretljivosti (u percepciji mladih). Naime, iako su obrazovanje i naporan 
rad istaknuti kao glavna poželjna sredstva napredovanja, bogato poreklo i političke veze su, 
u  stvari,  opaženi  od  strane  mladih  kao  najvažniji  faktori  u  Srbiji  u  protekloj  deceniji. 
Politička  nestabilnost,  (još  uvek)  nedovršene  reforme  političkog  i  privrednog  sistema  i 
ekonomski  rast  bez  nove  zaposlenosti  (pogotovo  za  mlade)  su  ključni  razlozi  zbog  kojih 
postoji,  manje-više,  neprestana  razmišljanje  polovine  mladih  da  napusti  Srbiju  zauvek. 
Glavna teza ovog rada je da upravo pomenuta diskrepancija između stvarnog i poželjnog 
„društvenog reda“ predstavlja jednu od ključnih osnova takvog načina razmišljanja mladih 
osoba u Srbiji. 
KLJUČNE REČI mladi, Srbija, društveni uspon 
Introduction 
The  social  position  of  the  youth  in  the  countries  of  post-socialist 
transformation is, without doubt, very interesting (and socially relevant) topic for the 
researchers in the last two decades (Roberts, 2009; 2003; MacDonald et al., 2001; 
Wallace, Kovacheva, 1998; etc.). However, that is not the case in Serbia, where such 
studies have not been conducted for more than fifteen years, during the period of 
blocked  post-socialist  transformation.  In  fact,  only  one  empirical  research  was 
conducted in the 1990s on the sample of Belgrade youth (Mihailović, 1994). 
Nevertheless, after political changes in 2000 and unblocking of the process of 
post-socialist transformation (more on this in Lazić, Cvejić, 2004), several research 
attempts  have  been  made  to  investigate  the  social  position  and  orientations  of 
Serbian  youth  (Tomanović,  Ignjatović,  2006a;  2006b;  2004;  Mihailović,  2004, 
Mojić, 2005; etc.). At the same time, the process of political change has raised the 
expectations of young people regarding the improvement of their position in Serbian 
society. What are/should be the main channels of this improvement? 
Main goal of this paper is to analyze the perceptions and preferences of young 
people in Serbia concerning the ways to get ahead in the last decade. If there is a 
considerable discrepancy between these perceptions and preferences, we can say that 
the social integration of the youth in Serbian society is rather unsuccessful. It can 
also explain rather well the fact that half of the young people have been thinking 
about leaving the country permanently, which severely jeopardizes its development Dušan Mojić: Means of getting ahead in post-socialist Serbia...  305 
potentials,  prolonging  the  “actual  social  order”  and  “vicious  circle”  of 
underdevelopment. 
Conceptual and contextual framework 
The position and orientations of the youth in the post-socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe are especially important for social integration in rapidly changing 
social systems. According to influential social biography approach (Roberts et al., 
1994), structures set the conditions, possibilities and limitations  of action. These 
structures (institutions, resources and  norms) are  enabling, as  well as restricting, 
young  people  in  creating  their  social  biographies.  Generally  speaking,  in  all 
advanced industrial societies, transitions from compulsory education to employment 
have  been  prolonged  since  the  1970s,  posing  serious  obstacles  to  the  above-
mentioned process. Since then, broader trends towards structured individualization 
and  fragmentation  of  formerly  more  homogenous  social  groups  (including  the 
youth) have been widely recognized (Roberts et al, 1994: 31). 
Transition  risks  force  young  people  to  create  flexible  strategies  for 
advancement through education, work, and family relations. Neither life span nor 
transition paths are  fixed any more in a variety of economical, political and cultural 
changes in post-socialism. The notion of flexibility itself has been at first applied to 
the explanation of the behavior of work force in the labor market. It explains non-
standard forms of employment such as part-time employment, temporary and short-
term  employment,  self-employment,  homeworking,  work  on  a  contract  etc.,  that 
involve less formal rules and regulations. Late modernity theories brought about a 
connection  of  flexibility  with  risk,  uncertainty,  individualization  and  reflexivity. 
Flexibilization  of  work  represents  a  foundation  for  reflexive  and  self-creating 
biography,  individual  self-realization  and  creative  uncertainty  of  the  freedom 
(Kovacheva, 2001: 43). 
As for the post-socialist societies (including Serbia), what is common to the 
position  of  the  youth  is  a  disappearance  of  relatively  strongly  structured  and 
predictable  paths  of  life  transitions  and  its  flexibilization.  Youth  socialization  is 
taking  place  in  conditions  where  institutions,  processes  and  social  norms  that 
previously used to channel transition in the world of adults now vanished, or they 
are also in the process of substantial transformation. Although it is logical to state 
that the youth is a natural winner of transition (since they are oriented more towards, 
and prepared better for the changes brought about by social transformation), the 
majority of empirical studies showed that young people are still exposed more to 
new  and  greater  risks  rather  than  new  and  more  favorable  chances  of  social 
promotion (Ilišin, 2005: 19). 
The main proposition of this paper is that structures (institutions, resources 
and  norms)  in  Serbia  are  still  mostly  restrictive  (especially  for  young  people), 306  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 2 
mainly  based  on  strong  discrepancy  between  “preferred”  and  “perceived  social 
order”. These concepts are mostly based on the distinction of Claude Lévy-Strauss 
between the “order of orders” as it actually functions and the way in which a society 
(or its particular social groups) conceive of its ordering (Lévy-Strauss, 1963: XV). 
Rihtman-Auguštin (1984) revealed the  existence  of these two  different  orders  in 
South-European traditional family zadruga. Also, Županov (1982) emphasized that 
the  discrepancy  between  the  “preferred”  and  “perceived  social  order”  was  much 
wider in Yugoslav socialism than in most other societies. 
As for the post-socialist Serbian society, it is often defined (Antonić, 1993) as 
a  system  of  “political  capitalism”.  The  concept  itself  has  been  introduced  in 
sociology  by  Max  Weber,  referring  to  economic  systems  based  on  the  use  of 
economically irrational, mostly politically created monopoles, in the various forms 
of  market  (in  a  technical  sense,  as  merchandise-monetary)  economy.  Political 
capitalism in Serbia arose, according to Antonić, after the breakdown of the former 
socialist system, in an institutional vacuum used by the new-old elite to take over the 
complete administration of the “social” property and, even more importantly, the 
possibilities  of “irrational”  (non-market) profit  gains. The  war and  UN sanctions 
gave  this  elite  a  “perfect  cover”  for  various  kinds  of  abuse,  always  justified  by 
“higher  national  interests”.  Because  of  the  state-induced  hyperinflation,  the  last 
remains  of the  healthy  economic “tissue” and  normal  economic  logic  have been 
destroyed (Arandarenko, 2000: 347-348). 
The above-mentioned discrepancy between “preferred” and “perceived social 
order” has been, no doubt, additionally widened during the period of blocked post-
socialist  transformation.  “On  the  one  hand,  there  was  a  powerful  presence  of 
distributive social norms (produced, as already indicated, by the command (centrally 
planned)  socialist  economy,  but  structurally  homologous  also  to  the  pre-market 
agrarian  self-sufficient  economy,  characteristic  of  a  country  in  the  pre-capitalist 
period); and  on the  other, the  effects  of  norms  derived  from the  market type  of 
economic  operations  (arriving  not  only  from  the  outside,  from  the  capitalist 
surroundings, but to a certain degree also present in the specific Yugoslav “market” 
socialism)” (Lazić, 2003: 210). 
After the political changes in 2000, however, potential “winners” in the post-
socialist transformation  (especially the  youth)  were rather  optimistic  when asked 
about the future of Serbian society. Nevertheless, one of the first conclusions of the 
youth studies after 2000 was that there had been some improvements in this respect, 
but,  according  to  young  respondents,  these  changes  were  neither  deep  nor  wide 
enough (Mihailović, 2004). 
What are the main characteristics of a subjective social position of the youth 
in the first decade of post-socialist transformation? First, young people’s subjective 
social status findings of 2003 study (Mojić, 2004) will be presented, in  order to 
grasp the views and expectations of the youth after the political change. Namely, Dušan Mojić: Means of getting ahead in post-socialist Serbia...  307 
self-perception of social position represents an important framework of reference for 
understanding  the  individual  and  group  action,  as  well  as  for  social  integration. 
Majority of Serbian youth perceived their life in 2003 as average or good, but they 
perceived the lives of their friends as slightly better at that time. It is interesting that 
their  estimate  of  their  life  and  their  friends’  and  peers’  life  had  been  rather 
optimistic. In other words, positive political change gave hope for improvement of 
their social position (as probable winners in the transformation). 
However,  transition  from  education  to  employment  in  Serbia  after  2000 
reveals  very  unfavorable  situation  of  young  people.  General  labor  market 
participation rate is low, since only 75% of the population that completed education 
enters  the  labor  market.  By  comparison,  more  than  90%  of  the  youth  after 
completing  education  (at  all  levels)  in  OECD  countries  participate  in  the  labor 
market  (Arandarenko, 2008: 271). According to the  official  data of the National 
Employment  Agency  of the Republic  of Serbia, youth unemployment rates have 
constantly been near 50% during the whole past decade. On the other hand, activity 
and  employment  rates  were  very  low.  Because  of  different  methodology  of 
unemployment survey (i.e. organizing the Labor Force Survey), the figures  have 
been less dramatic in recent years, but still very high in comparative context. In 
2011,  activity  rate  of  persons  aged  15-64  years  (contingent  work)  was  58.9% 
(inactivity rate 41.1%), unemployment rate 22.9% and employment rate 45.5%. As 
for the youth from 15 to 24 years old, activity rate was 28.1 (inactivity rate 71.9%), 
unemployment  rate  49.9%  and  employment  rate  14.1.  Finally,  for  young  people 
aged 25-34 activity rate was 77.8%, inactivity rate 22.2%, while employment rate 
was 54.2% with unemployment of 30.3% (Anketa o radnoj snazi, april 2011) [Labor 
Force Survey, April 2011]. 
The  obstacles  to  youth  individualization  in  Serbia  are  clearly  of  socio-
systemic and cultural nature. Since the former ones have been previously mentioned, 
the latter will be presented here. Namely, it has often been argued that our culture 
still  belongs  predominantly  to  the  group  of  pre-industrial  cultures  (Obradović, 
1982). Such cultures are based on an implicit and subconscious “Image of Limited 
Good”  (Foster,  1965).  By  the  “Image  of  Limited  Good”  Foster  means  that  the 
behavior of peasant farmers is patterned in such a fashion as to suggest that farmers 
view their social, economic, and natural universes – their total environment – as one 
in which all of the desired things in life such as land, wealth, health, friendship and 
love,  manliness and honor, respect and status, power and influence, security and 
safety, exist in a finite quantity and always in short supply, as far as the farmer is 
concerned. Not only do these and all other “good things” exist in finite and limited 
quantities, but in addition to this, there is no direct way within farmer’s power to 
increase  the  available  quantities.  It  follows  that  an  individual  or  a  family  can 
improve their position only at the expense of others (Foster, 1965: 296-297). This 
“redistribution norm” can be seen as one of the main cultural obstacles to the youth 
advancement.  Instead  of  meritocracy  (based  on  education,  knowledge,  skills  and 308  SOCIOLOGIJA, Vol. LIV (2012), N° 2 
hard work), redistribution is culturally favored in Serbian society for almost two 
centuries.  This  pre-modern  cultural  pattern  is  particularly  unfavorable  for  young 
people, mostly pro-market and pro-modern oriented, relying mostly on education 
and hard work as the main channels of “climbing up” the stratification ladder in 
Serbia today. 
Naturally, experiencing these structural and cultural limitations, the choice of 
main life strategies of young people in Serbia involves a delay in key life events or 
“turnarounds”: a delay in completing the education, a delay in living independently, 
a  delay  in  having  a  family  of  orientation,  etc.  According  to  Tomanović  and 
Ignjatović (2004: 62), this process  can be characterized as “forced”  or “pseudo” 
individualization.  Therefore,  extreme  levels  of  labor  market  inactivity  and 
unemployment  of  Serbian  youth  represent  a  kind  of  flexibilization  of  work  that 
definitely cannot be a foundation for the previously mentioned reflexive and self-
creating  biography,  individual  self-realization  and  creative  uncertainty  of  the 
freedom (Kovacheva, 2001: 43).   
Methodology  
Main  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  compare  the  perceptions  and  preferences  of 
young  people  in  Serbia  regarding  the  means  of  social  advancement  in  the  first 
decade of post-socialist transformation in Serbia. Our key hypothesis is that there 
has been a strong discrepancy between these perceptions and preferences, based on 
the presented long-term cultural divide between “preferred” and “perceived social 
order”, as well as on the social context in the last two decades (blocked and, later on, 
delayed transformation). 
Main source for the analysis presented in the text were two surveys conducted 
by  the  Institute  of  Sociological  Research  (ISR)  of  the  Faculty  of  Philosophy 
(University  of  Belgrade).  First  survey  of  a  national  representative  sample  was 
organized as a part of a wider research on socio-economic strategies of individuals 
and  households  in  Serbia  in  2007.  Sub-sample  of  young  people  (aged  18-35) 
consisted of 558 respondents. Second survey of everyday life of young people in 
Serbia  was  conducted  in  2011.  The  representative  sample  consisted  of  1627 
respondents aged 19-35.  
Results and discussion 
After the political changes in 2000, education has been perceived by young 
people as the single most important factor of advancement in Serbian society (Mojić, 
2004). In ranking the different forms of capital (cultural – education, economic – 
wealthy  origin  and  social  –  knowing  the  “right  people”)  and  personal  traits 
(ambition, hard work, readiness to take business risks), young respondents preferred Dušan Mojić: Means of getting ahead in post-socialist Serbia...  309 
cultural capital (good education), but also the above-mentioned “market” individual 
traits.  In  spite  of  rather  unfavorable  “transitional”  social  context,  they  showed  a 
strong  conviction  that  they  themselves  have  a  major  influence  on  their  life 
transitions (or, in other words, an internal “locus of control”). 
However, between 2003 and 2007 (and the two youth studies – Mojić, 2004; 
2010),  young  people  have  shown  less  firm  belief  that  education,  ambition,  hard 
work and risk-taking can move them up the stratification ladder in Serbian society, 
admitting the common fact that “knowing the right people” (including holders of 
political power) has become far more important. On the other hand, they were still 
convinced in 2007 (more than half of them) that good education should be the most 
important advancement factor in Serbia in post-socialism. Next on the list was hard 
work (one quarter emphasized it), while other factors were mentioned less than 10%. 
Nevertheless, it is interesting that, when asked to choose one “life strategy”, young 
respondents chose education more often in 2007 than in 2003, still having faith in 
the  most  common  modern  factor  of  the  upward  mobility  in  the  (post)modern 
societies  –  cultural  capital.  Finally,  next  section  of  the  paper  introduces  a 
comparative analysis (ISR studies in 2007 and 2011) of Serbian youth’s perceptions 
and preferences regarding the means of getting ahead in post-socialist Serbia. 
 
Table 1 “Real social order” – the youth’s perception of the most 
important factors of advancement in Serbian society (ISR 2007 and 2011 study) 
Factors of 
advancement 
Rank  
I  II  III  Σ 
 Year of study   Year of study   Year of study   Year of study 
2007  2011  2007  2011  2007  2011  2007  2011 
Good education  27.5  15.2  11.5  10.0  9.2  8.6  48.2  33.8 
Knowing “the 
right people” 
20.6  24.2  21.5  29.4  16.8  15.2  58.9  68.8 
 
Wealthy origin  15.9  19.2  6.2  9.9  8.9  13.4  31  42.5 
Political 
engagement 
12.5  16.3  15.6  16.5  10.2  16.7  38.3  49.5 
Ambition  8.5  10.4  17.2  13.0  12.1  11.2  37.8  34.6 
Hard work  8.0  10.7  15.8  13.2  14.8  11.9  38.6  35.8 
Readiness to 
take a business 
risk 
3.5  1.5  6.4  3.8  12.5  11.0  22.4  16.3 
Obedience   2.8  1.6  3.2  2.6  10.3  8.8  16.3  13 
 
Table 1 presents ranks I, II and III, as well as the sum of all ranks of the 
perceived factors of advancement (“Real social order”). As for the first rank, good 
education has dropped drastically in ranking: from position one (27.5%) in 2007 to 
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origin (19.2%) and political engagement (16.3%)! In sum (all three ranks together), 
education dropped from 48.2% to 33.8% from 2007 to 2011! On the other hand, 
knowing “the right people” rose from 58.9% in 2007 to 68.8% in 2011, similar as 
wealthy origin (from 31% to 42.5%) and political engagement (from 38.3% to 49.5)! 
In accordance with the observed “pattern”, ambition, hard work and readiness to 
take a business risk were perceived as much less important in 2011 than in 2007 
(34.6% vs. 37.8%, 35.8% vs. 38.6% and 16.3% vs. 22.4%, respectively)! 
Table  2  introduces  Serbian  youth’s  choice  of  one  preferred  factor  of 
advancement (“Desired social order”). Good education experienced a huge drop here 
too, from 51.7% in 2007 to 43.7% in 2011, while the importance of hard work (from 
27.8%  to  29.4%)  and  especially  ambition  (6.8%  in  2007  and  12.2%  in  2011) 
increased. 
Finally, when asked about their own “life strategy”, young respondents chose 
hard work first of all, (43.5%), followed by good education (24.3%) and ambition 
(16.9%). The remaining factors  were singled out by less than 10%. We can see 
clearly that the youth in Serbia lost faith in education as the main “realistic” channel 
of  getting ahead, one  decade after the beginning  of  unblocking the post-socialist 
transformation. 
 
Table 2 “Desired social order” – the youth’s preference for the most important 
factors of advancement in Serbian society (ISR 2007 and 2011 study) 
 
Factors of advancement 
Year of study 
2007  2011 
Good education  51.7  43.7 
Knowing “the right people”  4.3  5.3 
Wealthy origin  1.1  2.1 
Political engagement  1.3  2.6 
Ambition  6.8  12.2 
Hard work  27.8  29.4 
Readiness to take a business risk  3.8  1.6 
Obedience  1.5  1.3 
 
How  can  we  explain  these  findings?  The  concept  of  normative-value 
dissonance  (Lazić,  Cvejić,  2007)  can  help  as  in  the  analysis.  Namely,  this 
dissonance is most commonly seen in situations that include a radical change of the 
dominant social context, when  new  forms of basic social relationships are being 
established, including the new normative system. In the “transitional” period, new 
normative system becomes dominant; some elements of the “old social order” still 
persist. The same duality can be observed in the sphere of values. Since values have 
cultural-historical  foundation,  this  duality  lasts  even  much  longer.  This  parallel 
existence of a new dominant and an old normative system, as well as the new and Dušan Mojić: Means of getting ahead in post-socialist Serbia...  311 
old  values,  can  bring  about  a  situation  where  a  large  number  of  individuals  act 
within the specific normative system, keeping or adopting some conflicting value 
orientations.  This  contradiction  is  called  normative-value  dissonance  and  it  is 
common in situations where the social order (mainly through its normative system) 
confronts active individuals with requirements that are dissonant or even conflicted 
with their own value patterns. Furthermore, in such historical circumstances when 
the  whole  dominant  system  of  social  relations  is  changing,  normative-value 
dissonance can exist on the level of entire social groups (Lazić, Cvejić, 2007: 56). 
In our view, young people belong to the very few social groups in Serbia that 
do  not  show  this  normative-value  dissonance  or,  to  put  it  better,  which  express 
normative-value  consonance.  In  fact,  as  potential  winners  in  the  transformation 
process,  they  showed  a  very  strong  conviction  that,  with  modernization  and 
democratization of the political system and the society in general, education and 
hard work will be realistic and attainable channels of vertical mobility in Serbian 
society.  However,  one  decade  after  Serbia’s  “October  Revolution”,  the  youth 
learned the hard way the reality of knowing “the right people”, wealthy origin and 
political connections (all in a pre-modern sense). Namely, in the “real social order”, 
they are well-educated but predominantly unemployed, still living with their parents, 
and having even worse prospects or the future. 
Main aim of this paper was to compare youth’s perceptions and preferences 
regarding  the  main  channels  of  advancement  in  contemporary  Serbian  society. 
Although education and hard work have been emphasized by young people as the 
main preferred means of getting ahead, knowing “the right people”, wealthy origin 
and political connections have been, in fact, perceived as the most important factors 
in this respect in Serbia during the last decade. What is especially unfavorable for 
the social integration in Serbia today, this distance between the youth’s perceived 
and preferred “social order” is constantly increasing as time goes by. 
 
Table 3 Thinking about leaving Serbia on the part of young respondents  
(ISR 2011 study) 
  %  Cumulative %  
(two categories) 
I have not been thinking about that  23.5   
47.1  I do not want to leave Serbia  23.6 
I want to move abroad, but I do not stand a 
chance 
4.8   
 
 
52.9 
If an opportunity emerges, I will take it  36.2 
I will try to leave, but I do not know if I am 
going to succeed    
5.8 
I have a firm plan to go abroad  3.4 
I am taking decisive steps to move abroad  2.8  100.0 
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This discrepancy can, in our opinion, explain to a large extent the findings 
presented in Table 3. Namely, less than one half of youth (47.1%) in Serbia today 
have not been thinking about leaving Serbia (23.5%) or say clearly they do not want 
to  leave  (23.6%).  On  the  other  hand,  the  majority  of  young  people  had  some 
thoughts or actions in this direction. Facing strong structural and cultural obstacles 
to their structured individualization, the youth’s personal strategies and identities are 
themselves very fluid and unpredictable. However, one thing has not changed in 
Serbia  in  the  last  decade  –  the  fact  that  half  of  its  youth  have  been  constantly 
thinking about social integration – but elsewhere. 
Conclusion  
What  are  the  consequences  of  the  above-presented  findings  for  the  social 
integration of young people in Serbia today? In the late 1960s, the very system was 
brought into question by young generation of an educated, urban, well-informed, 
individualized, mostly middle-class (“modernized”) population. Again, in the 1990s, 
this stratum was very persistent in resistance to the Milošević regime and cultural 
regression  to  traditionalist  patterns  (anti-individualism,  authoritarianism, 
egalitarianism/ redistribution, etc). 
After the political changes in 2000, this social group was supposed to become 
one  of  the  social  and  cultural  “pillars”  of  the  new  “social  order”.  However,  the 
youth’s perceptions of “desired social order” in 2011 are still very far from the “real 
social order”, mostly because “the factors leading to normative-value dissonance are 
still very firm, both owing to the delayed transformation and the processes of long 
historical duration” (Lazić, 2003: 211). 
Also, when talking about the division between traditionalistic and modernistic 
oriented segments of the Serbian population, Lazić (2003: 2006) rightly reminds us 
of the frequently mentioned fact that the “new emigration” in the 1990s was young 
and well educated.  Two decades later, young and well-educated people in Serbia are 
still  ready  to  “vote  with  their  feet”  –  half  of  them  still  think  about  leaving  the 
country. This is, perhaps, the strongest evidence that the Serbian youth seriously 
question the legitimacy of the “new (old?) social order” and that social integration 
into such a society is not very high on the list of their priorities. Dušan Mojić: Means of getting ahead in post-socialist Serbia...  313 
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